Current Issue : January - March Volume : 2020 Issue Number : 1 Articles : 5 Articles
The objective of this paper is to study a pursuit differential game with finite or countably\nnumber of pursuers and one evader. The game is described by differential equations in l2-space,\nand integral constraints are imposed on the control function of the players. The duration of the game\nis fixed and the payoff functional is the greatest lower bound of distances between the pursuers and\nevader when the game is terminated. However, we discuss the condition for finding the value of\nthe game and construct the optimal strategies of the players which ensure the completion of the\ngame. An important fact to note is that we relaxed the usual conditions on the energy resources of\nthe players. Finally, some examples are provided to illustrate our result....
Game spaces in which an organism must repeatedly compete with an opponent for\nmutually exclusive outcomes are critical methodologies for understanding decision-making under\npressure. In the non-transitive game rock, paper, scissors (RPS), the only technique that guarantees\nthe lack of exploitation is to perform randomly in accordance with mixed-strategy. However,\nsuch behavior is thought to be outside bounded rationality and so decision-making can become\ndeterministic, predictable, and ultimately exploitable. This review identifies similarities across\neconomics, neuroscience, nonlinear dynamics, human, and animal cognition literatures, and provides\na taxonomy of RPS strategy. RPS strategies are discussed in terms of (a) whether the relevant\ncomputations require sensitivity to item frequency, the cyclic relationships between responses, or\nthe outcome of the previous trial, and (b) whether the strategy is framed around the self or other.\nThe negative implication of this taxonomy is that despite the differences in cognitive economy and\nrecursive thought, many of the identified strategies are behaviorally isomorphic. This makes it difficult\nto infer strategy from behavior. The positive implication is that this isomorphism can be used as a\nnovel design feature in furthering our understanding of the attribution, agency, and acquisition of\nstrategy in RPS and other game spaces....
Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of well-organized societies and public good games are\na useful metaphor for modeling cooperative behavior in the presence of strong incentives to free ride.\nUsually, social agents interact to play a public good game through network structures. Here, we use\nsocial network structures and computational agent rules inspired by recent experimental work\nin order to develop models of agent behavior playing public goods games. The results of our\nnumerical simulations based on a couple of simple models show that agents behave in a manner\nqualitatively similar to what has been observed experimentally. Computational models such as\nthose presented here are very useful to interpret observed behavior and to enhance computationally\nthe limited variation that is possible in the experimental domain. By assuming a priori reasonable\nindividual behaviors, the easiness of running simulations could also facilitate exploration prior to\nany experimental work in order to vary and estimate a number of key parameters that would be very\ndifficult, if not impossible, to change during the actual experiment....
The problem of the existence of Berge equilibria in the sense of Zhukovskii in normal-form\nfinite games in pure and in mixed strategies is studied. The example of a three-player game that has\nBerge equilibrium neither in pure, nor in mixed strategies is given....
In the paper, we use the differential game method to test the impact of joint implementation (JI) mechanism on pollution\ncontrol in two bilateral countries.The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations of the models are obtained by using the dynamic\nprogramming principle.We obtain the optimal emissions, optimal local and foreign investments in environment projects, optimal\nrevenues, and optimal trajectories of carbon stock under three situations, namely, situation without JI,with JI (noncooperative), and\nwith JI (cooperative), of the two countries by solving these equations. We also compare their optimal Nash equilibrium solutions.\nWe find that the introduction of JI mechanismcan slow down the growth of the carbon stocks by reducing emissions or increasing\ninvestment in emission reduction projects, compared to the situation without JI mechanism. However, the JI mechanism does\nnot reduce the revenue of the two countries under certain conditions. Finally, some numerical tests are provided to illustrate the\ntheoretical results....
Loading....